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Abstract
The Slovak approach to decreasing health-
care costs is based on a changed interpretation 
of the concept of ‘a minimum network of provid-
ers’. This study describes the changes made 
in the healthcare system in Slovakia in order to 
keep it affordable. It shows how the initial inter-
pretation of a minimum network as an assurance 
for general access to healthcare services slow-
ly changed into a cutback making the minimum 
network an upper limit for healthcare. The study 
argues that the complexity of the network made 
for non-transparent policies, in which consulta-
tion was nearly absent and vertical power be-
came dominant, despite the semi-independence 
of actors in the network. This observation runs 
counter to the network theory suggestion that in 
complex networks, with semi-independent ac-
tors, vertical power becomes useless. 
Keywords: healthcare coordination, semi-in-
dependent institutions, networks.
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1. Introduction
There is a generally shared agreement among experts that healthcare is at least 
in part a collective good that cannot be solely the individual responsibility of the 
citizens. Arguments supporting state intervention are based on the allocative activi-
ties and redistributive functions of government (Stiglitz , 2000; Maly, 1998). Feldstein 
(1993) argued that healthcare is an impure public good; subject to information asym-
metry, externalities, uncertainty, and complexity. Because of information asymme-
try, the most important factor limiting individual demand for health services is the 
inability to pay for such services individually, while from a social perspective, the 
general opinion, at least in developed Europe, is that all people are eligible for basic 
healthcare services, independent of their ability to pay. This opinion is demonstrated 
in, for example, the European Charter of Social Rights. 
However, there are increasing diﬃ  culties in keeping healthcare aﬀ ordable. In ad-
dition to contextual developments, such as the greying of society, the cost increase in 
healthcare is caused by the complexity of its network. As in all networks, this one is 
characterized by tension between the goals of each level involved in coordination of 
inpatient care and the presumed goals of the network as a whole, a strong resource 
dependency between the organizations involved, a complex of incentives that varies 
among the organizations involved and is contradictory from the perspective of the 
network of organizations, transaction costs that are largely determined by extensive-
ly monitoring and evaluating the performance of each of the constituting organiza-
tions, and opportunistic behavior among each of the organizations involved. Theories 
on inter-organizational relations are concerned with explaining the nature and conse-
quences of specifi c types of relationships among organizations and the coordination 
thereof. The relationships may be defi ned in terms of their structure, i.e. alliances, 
partnerships, and networks, although many other connotations also exist (Cropper 
et al., 2008). Overviews of theories in inter-organizational relations are found in Van 
de Ven (1976), Galaskiewicz (1985), Oliver (1990), Barringer and Harrison (2000) and 
Cropper et al. (2008). 
However, while theorizing about the coordination and management of networks 
is still concerned with questions such as how to govern such complex networks in 
practice (Kenis and Provan, 2007), some governments have opted for a pragmatic 
solution that is, simply reducing the complexity of the network. This is, of course, 
easier said than done, and especially in healthcare it could have serious negative con-
sequences. Nevertheless, this was the solution of the Slovak government, as well as 
the Hungarian government, in order to make the healthcare system manageable and 
aﬀ ordable. 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the way in which Slovak central and regional 
governments accomplish the task of optimizing the network of inpatient health ser-
vices in Slovakia, and to evaluate the eﬀ ects of this change on healthcare services. The 
paper focuses on this pragmatic solution, compared to the multitude of theoretical 
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suggestions to coordinate complex networks, by presenting a case study of Slova-
kia, where ‘healthcare network’ is rather decentralized: most healthcare providers are 
privately owned establishments, and most healthcare fi nance is in the hands of a net-
work of at least formally competing public and private health insurance companies. 
The Slovak solution to the issue of physical access is largely based on an interest-
ing coordination tool: the ‘minimum network of providers’. In the core part of this pa-
per, we investigate how this minimum network has been defi ned in the subsystem of 
inpatient care (specialized hospitals excluded), and closely examine the policy imple-
mentation aspects. Our focus is on how the minimum network of inpatient care has 
been achieved through the coordinated activities of the state, at both the central and 
regional levels. Before that, we present an overview of the developments in complex 
network management theories (in our case such complex network is the network of 
coordination and delivery bodies described in the later text), of which it is remarkable 
that simplifying the complexity of networks seems to have never been considered. 
The fi nal part of the paper displays current results in the area, analyses the pros and 
cons of intervention, and presents several important observations on the policy-mak-
ing and implementation capacities of the Slovak government, and on the complexity 
of coordinating pluralistic service-delivery systems1. 
The main method used to draft this paper is the secondary analysis of existing 
data and information. Brief interviews with regional politicians, administrators and 
academic experts helped to frame the text.
2. Developments in complex network theories
The fi rst systematic studies about networks, networking, and building coalitions 
in organizations are from the late 1950s and 1960s (Dill, 1958; Levine and White, 1961; 
Evan, 1965, 1966). This classical research described interactions between people across 
organizations who aim to create networks for gett ing things done and for exchang-
ing information. These interactions often go beyond the formal structure of the orga-
nization and are assumed to accomplish more than could be accomplished by only 
going through formal channels. To create a network is seen as a rather simple task; it 
involves simply identifying people who could be helpful in the process of achieving 
the desired objectives, establishing their reliability, and then actively seeking their 
cooperation. Literature on this subject shows that a shared aim, i.e., ‘gett ing things 
done in an organization’ is involved in creating alliances i.e., ‘gett ing agreement on a 
course of action with other people and joining forces to get things done’ (Armstrong, 
2006; Bolman and Deal, 2003). According to Evan (1965), social science research had 
previously been concerned primarily with networks understood as intra-organiza-
tional phenomena. During this time, the theory and methodology impeded research 
1 The preparation of this paper was co-fi nanced also by the Czech Grant Agency project GACR 
P403/12/0366.
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on inter-organizational relations. To solve this problem, Evan suggested two meth-
odological tools that could prove useful in the development of empirical research on 
inter-organizational relations: graph theory and input-output analysis. The fi rst tool 
was developed in research dealing with network visualization; the second is known 
as transaction cost economics [TCE], focusing on control phenomenon in inter-orga-
nizational relations.
During the 1980s and 1990s, scholars and practitioners (Perrow, 1992) described a 
growing interest in the networks and multi-organizational relations that are usually 
created to solve the complex problems that occur mainly in the private sector but also 
in the public sector. A network was defi ned as a ‘group of more or less independent 
organizations that have a relatively stable and long-term cooperation’ (Grandori and 
Soda, 1995 apud Jacobsen and Thursvik, 2002). The core position was that networking 
can essentially support and promote projects, programs, ideas, and sharing knowl-
edge (Nohria and Eccels, 1992; Alter and Hage, 1993; Borgatt i and Foster, 2003). 
Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) scrutinized contemporary articles dealing with 
inter-organizational networks in industry. According to their study, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that empirical studies have successfully created a theory about 
networks. The research on networks and inter-organizational relations instead consti-
tutes fragmentary empirical studies focused on some important aspects of a network, 
but not examining the whole network. In organizational life, everybody talks about 
networks, but Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) argued that researchers are still unable 
to eﬀ ectively defi ne this phenomenon. According to them, researchers who focus on 
business and business relations even avoid the concept of networks. Instead, they talk 
about ‘partnerships, strategic alliances, inter-organizational relationships, coalitions, 
cooperative arrangements or collaborative agreements’. Other scholars interested in 
resource dependency theory (e.g., Pfeﬀ er and Salancik, 2003), transaction cost eco-
nomics (e.g., Williamson, 1991) or investigating inter-organizational contracts (e.g., 
Ariño and Reuer, 2006) often pay att ention only to organizations and social relations 
between concrete actors involved in cooperating on behalf of their organizations, 
which cannot be perceived as research on networks as a whole (Provan, Fish and 
Sydow, 2007). 
2.1. The coordination of network complexity
How networks are managed is a crucial aspect of network analysis. Classic theory 
(for a summary, see for example Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997) suggests that 
hierarchy and steering is needed to manage a network. This theory is currently dis-
puted, because there is a dilemma involving trust and governance in which too much 
governance steering and state responsibility can be costly and redundant because of 
the justifi ed trust, but too litt le steering can be as costly because of inadequate safe-
guards in reducing opportunistic behavior (discussed for example in Groeneveld and 
Van de Walle, 2011). Those responsible often try to minimize the second failure and 
therefore opt for steering even though it can be redundant and costly. Theoretical ar-
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guments for ‘massive’ state interventions in modern healthcare systems are widely ac-
cepted by the current logistics of healthcare systems in developed countries, and to a 
large extent in developing countries as well: normally the state is responsible or co-re-
sponsible for all the most important aspects of healthcare delivery, specifi cally for 
fi nancing (accumulating and distributing resources), quality, and access assurance. 
The ways in which such ‘state responsibility’ is executed vary signifi cantly among 
countries. Some common models can be identifi ed. For example, Bjorkman and Al-
tenstett er (1998) identify four main forms of ‘managing’ healthcare services:
 – A state-dominated, general-taxation-based model (tax revenues fi nance a major 
part of health services and a single public body is responsible for managing the 
most important aspects of healthcare delivery);
 – A state-dominated, social-insurance-based model (compulsory health-insurance 
revenues fi nance a major part of health services and a single public body is re-
sponsible for managing the most important aspects of healthcare delivery);
 – A pluralistic, social-insurance-based model (compulsory health-insurance reve-
nues fi nance a major part of health services, several independent health-insur-
ance companies reimburse services, and the state has a coordinative function); 
and
 – A market-based model, where the role of the state is marginalized, and access de-
pends very much on the ability to pay, though some social assistance programs 
may support access by vulnerable groups.
The boundaries among all these models are unclear. In practice, all real healthcare 
systems represent some kind of mixture. Even the diﬀ erence between taxation-based 
revenues and health-insurance revenues is somewhat artifi cial; for example, Vostatek 
(2010) argues that social insurance can also be perceived as a form of taxation. 
According to Kenis and Provan (2007) shared network governance will be most 
eﬀ ective for achieving network-level outcomes when trust is widely shared among 
network participants (high-density, decentralized trust), when there are relatively 
few network participants, when network-level goal consensus is high, and when the 
need for network-level competencies is low.
Lead organization network governance will be most eﬀ ective for achieving net-
work-level outcomes when trust is narrowly shared among network participants 
(low-density, highly centralized trust), when there are a relatively moderate number 
of network participants, when network-level goal consensus is moderately low, and 
when the need for network-level competencies is moderate.
Network governance by a network administrative organization will be most ef-
fective for achieving network-level outcomes ‘when trust is moderately to widely 
shared among network participants (moderate-density trust), when there are a mod-
erate to high number of network participants, when network-level goal consensus is 
moderately high, and when the need for network-level competencies is high’ (Kenis 
and Provan, 2007, p. 13).
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Many governments cannot, or at least do not, wait for the fi nal answers. This was 
the case in Slovakia. The government opted for a much simpler solution in coordinat-
ing the complex healthcare system: reducing the complexity of the network through 
the principle of a ‘minimum network of providers’. The results are described in the 
next sections.
3. Coordinating changes of the network providing
          inpatient healthcare in Slovakia
The Slovak Republic was established on 1 January 1993 as a result of the friend-
ly dissolution of Czechoslovakia, following the major changes after the 1989 ‘Velvet 
Revolution’. 
The process of reforming the Slovak healthcare system started immediately after 
the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Important changes were introduced, especially privat-
ization and the shift from fi nancing healthcare through general taxation to pluralistic 
social health insurance. At the same time, there was a focus on maintaining universal 
access and ensuring a ‘basic package’ for all citizens, regardless of their ability to pay. 
Privatization is now nearly complete, except at the hospital level. The administration 
of the Slovak healthcare system can be described as decentralized and based more 
on coordination than direct management. This is due to the existence of several inde-
pendent or semi-independent actors on the ‘supply’ side of the healthcare market, as 
described below.
A: The State: represented especially by parliament, by central, regional, and local 
governments, and by a specifi c agency: the Healthcare Surveillance Authority. The 
parliament is responsible for the legislative base for healthcare and it makes deci-
sions about resources by sett ing the level of insurance premiums. The Ministry of 
Health (central government) is responsible for health policy development and imple-
mentation, which involved several diﬀ erent types of activities, especially defi ning the 
network of health establishments, coordinating central healthcare programs, and es-
tablishing and managing teaching hospitals and other specialized units (but has only 
general regulatory power in relation to the hospitals managed/ licensed by the region-
al governments). The Ministry of Health is also responsible for medical staﬀ  training 
and for the categorization of medicines. The Healthcare Surveillance Authority was 
established in 2004 as a part of agencifi cation in Slovakia (Nemec, Sagat and Lawson, 
2012). Its main tasks are to supervise the provision of healthcare and public health in-
surance and to arbitrate between actors. Almost fully independent regional self-gov-
ernments are responsible for regional hospitals (regional or sub-regional hospitals, 
which may not provide complex inpatient services). By 2003, all these hospitals had 
been transferred to regional governments or converted into non-profi t bodies. Region-
al governments are tasked with the maintenance of a minimum network of healthcare 
providers in their regions, including the licensing of all local and regional provid-
ers. Municipalities have limited responsibilities in the local network of providers.
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B: Health Insurance Companies: In healthcare fi nancing, Slovakia switched to 
the ‘Bismarck’ system of social health insurance, where independent health insur-
ance companies are responsible for collecting, distributing, and managing the bulk 
of fi nance. Soon after the start of Slovakia’s pluralistic health insurance system, 13 
health-insurance companies were established. However, most of them later exited the 
market because of mergers or bankruptcies. As of 2014, only three health-insurance 
companies are still in existence in Slovakia: one public shareholder company, VsZP, 
with about 65% of the market, and two private health insurance companies, Dovera 
with about 25% of the market, and the smallest company, Union. Health insurance 
companies are responsible for collecting insurance premiums and paying for the ser-
vices provided to their clients, the insured. The companies must conclude contracts 
with establishments belonging to the minimum network, but not with other estab-
lishments. In this way, they are able to infl uence the size and structure of the network 
of health service providers.
C: Healthcare Providers (outpatient and inpatient care). This paper concerns 
only hospital inpatient care – the network of hospitals in Slovakia consists of teach-
ing hospitals (13 hospitals in 2014), managed directly by the Ministry of Health, and 
of regional hospitals. Regional hospitals have, as the result of the 2004 reform (for 
more see Nemec et al., 2013), very diﬀ erent ownership forms, may belong to regional 
self-governments, and may be established as independent non-state, non-profi t orga-
nizations; some of them are fully privatized bodies. 
3.1. ‘Minimum network’ of hospital inpatient healthcare in Slovakia
The main principle of the Slovak healthcare system is that it guarantees universal 
and equal access to all health services, regardless of the patient’s residence or abil-
ity to pay (in practice, however, this principle is impossible to achieve). Legislation 
includes important elements to guarantee physical access to all types of healthcare 
services, and hence requires a ‘minimum network of healthcare providers’. Such min-
imum networks should be established in outpatient and inpatient care and for emer-
gency services. This section of the paper describes how the interpretation of this ‘min-
imum network’ slowly changed from being a lower boundary to becoming an upper 
limit for the number of healthcare providers. The Healthcare Act (576/2004) defi nes 
the minimum network for inpatient and outpatient care as ‘a minimum number of 
publicly accessible providers on the territory of a regional self-government set by the 
number and structure of providers necessary to eﬀ ectively guarantee accessible, con-
tinual, and permanent professional healthcare, refl ecting the number of inhabitants, 
the geographic and demographic specifi cs of the region, the mortality and morbidi-
ty indicators of the territory, migration, and state security’. The Law on Emergency 
Services (579/2004) stipulating that every citizen has the right to emergency service 
within 15 minutes regulates access to emergency care (for more, see Nemec and Ko-
lisnichenko, 2006). 
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The Healthcare Act established the principle that a certain minimum number of 
providers should be available in a given territory, but it does not explain this issue 
in details. In particular, it does not defi ne ‘minimum network’ any more concretely, 
and it does not set clear responsibilities for establishing and maintaining ‘minimum 
networks’ – it fails to defi ne the roles of the Ministry of Health, regional self-govern-
ments, or other actors. In such a situation – unclear legislation and the existence of 
several independent actors – eﬀ ective coordination is the only available tool to fulfi ll 
this task. 
Based on the 2004 healthcare laws, the original focus of ‘minimum networks’ was 
to ensure physical access to health services for all inhabitants. However, the issue of 
the ‘minimum network in inpatient care’ was not addressed with any concrete action 
by the Ministry of Health or by the regional self-governments. The legal statement 
that everybody should have a certain minimum level of physical access to health ser-
vices remained almost a purely political proclamation for a long period, possibly be-
cause of changes in the government: after one year of implementing the 2004 set of 
healthcare reform goals, the right-wing government of Prime Minister Dzurinda was 
replaced by the left-wing government of Prime Minister Fico (for more, see Nemec et 
al., 2013). 
Over the years, a general dearth of resources, in combination with an excess supply 
of inpatient facilities, led to a change in the Slovak government’s att itude. Table 1 il-
lustrates the key economic aspects of the Slovak healthcare system, especially the per-
manent imbalance and increasing debt. Table 2 shows the main network indicators. 
On the revenue side, huge increases are seen in the health insurance premiums and 
Table 1: Financial resources for healthcare in Slovakia, in millions (EUR)
1995 20 00 2005 2008 2010
Health Insurance Companies Expenditures 500 880 2,400 3,300 3,400
Direct State Budget Expenditures 280 390 400 100 200
Direct Payments by Consumers 45 150 700 1,000 1,100
Total 825 1,420 3,500 4,400 4,700
Per cent of GDP 5.7 6.1 7.2 6.5 7.3
Balance of HC system (expenditures/revenues) -0.5 -7.9 -2.0 -3.1 -2.7
Source: Bjorkman and Nemec (2013)
Table 2: Health Resources in Slovakia in comparative perspective
1995 2000 2005 2008 2010
Doctors/ 1000 inhabitants Slovakia 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.9 3.5
Doctors/ 1000 inhabitants Hungary 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.0
Doctors/ 1000 inhabitants Slovenia 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4
Doctors/ 1000 inhabitants OECD x x x x 3.2
Hospital beds/ 100 000 inhabitants Slovakia 691 636 772 736 652
Hospital beds/ 100 000 inhabitants Hungary 897 818 790 720 710
Hospital beds/ 100 000 inhabitants Slovenia 574 540 483 459 457
Hospital beds/ 100 000 inhabitants OECD x x x x 360
Source: Bjorkman and Nemec (2013); OECD statistics
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direct payments; on the resource side, an increase in employment in the health busi-
ness is seen, as an increased number of hospital beds, which is twice the international 
standard. The tables show that reducing the complexity of the network in order to 
cope with increasing defi cits and visible ineﬃ  ciencies of the system became an urgent 
task for the government (fi gures from 2010 show immediate success in terms of ca-
pacities).
Under these circumstances, the Ministry of Health started to re-interpret the origi-
nal intention of ‘minimum network’ principle, and to assure access to health services 
in a rather diﬀ erent way. The Ministry decided to publish secondary legislation on 
the ‘minimum network’ with another real aim, namely the optimization of the net-
work. The ‘minimum network’ principle changed from a principle to assure access to 
a principle to maximize access and to decrease the number of small hospitals and the 
number of hospital beds. 
In late 2007, the Government of the Slovak Republic published a government de-
cree defi ning the minimum network for inpatient care. In this phase, the focus was 
mainly the protection of state-owned hospitals – the norm defi ned the 34 state-owned 
hospitals in their existing structure as representing the minimum network.
With the international fi scal crisis, the issue of optimization became more urgent 
in terms of the need to decrease excessive capacities. In 2011, the Government signifi -
cantly amended its decree on the minimum network. As a result, new central data 
on the minimum inpatient network were published by the Ministry of Health with a 
focus on signifi cantly decreasing the existing capacities. 
Before describing the processes on the central and regional levels, we need to note 
an important process characteristic, namely that the process did not refl ect good gov-
ernance principles, especially regarding transparency, predictability, and consulta-
tions. The Ministry of Health never revealed how it calculated the minimum network 
of inpatient care. It also did not consult with regions, despite the fact that regional 
establishments are the core part of inpatient care and regions are responsible for re-
gional hospitals. In addition, the Ministry of Health was expected to provide imple-
mentation guidelines for the regions in order to help them transpose the broad legal 
defi nition of the minimum network into practice. It delivered no guidelines beyond 
the detailed data from 2007 and 2011 that characterized the minimum network as the 
existing network.
3.2. Establishing the minimum network of inpatient hospital healthcare in Slovakia
The core actors engaged in the establishment of this minimum network are the 
Ministry of Health, relevant public hospitals, the public health insurance company 
VsZP, and the private health insurance companies Dovera and Union. From a man-
agement/coordination point of view, the Ministry of Health is the founder and coor-
dinator of the academic hospitals and nominates the directors of all such hospitals. In 
performing its function, it has both horizontal and vertical power. The Ministry also 
has informal vertical power in relation to the public health insurance company VsZP 
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(via its representatives on the board of this public shareholder company), but it needs 
to combine this vertical power with horizontal coordination tools. With regard to the 
private insurance companies, only horizontal tools can be used.
The optimization of the hospital network was a two-step process. First, the net-
work of ‘central level’ hospitals was defi ned as the set of state-owned hospitals under 
the authority of the Ministry of Health with a full range of services. The second step 
addressed the network of small hospitals under the authority of regional self-govern-
ments. At the central level, the task of optimizing the network of hospitals (the oﬃ  cial 
task in the creation of the ‘minimum network’) was much simpler than within the re-
gions. The task was just to choose which hospitals to include into the central network 
– by providing them with the status of academic hospitals. 
Under these conditions, the Ministry of Health proposed a minimum network of 
academic hospitals (on the basis of regional and population data) and implemented it 
relatively quickly and without signifi cant confl icts, because all of the insurance com-
panies accepted this network without complaints. The current network is relatively 
well balanced as follows:
1. Three children teaching hospitals – one in each of four NUTS II2 regions (Bratisla-
va serving to West Slovakia): Bratislava, Banska Bystrica, Kosice.
2. Three major ‘university’ teaching hospitals – one in each of four NUTS II regions 
(Bratislava serving to West Slovakia): Bratislava, Martin, and Kosice.
3. Seven ‘faculty’ teaching hospitals in all major cities of Slovakia, where university 
academic hospitals are not located – Trnava, Nitra, and Trencin in West Slovakia, 
Zilina and Banska Bystrica in Central Slovakia, and Presov in East Slovakia. One 
specifi c specialized neurosurgery teaching hospital is in Nove Zamky (West Slo-
vakia).
The changes at the regional level were much more complicated for several reasons. 
Although the Ministry of Health sets the norms for the minimum network, regional 
self-governments are formally responsible for it. Table 3 shows the heterogeneity of 
the hospital structures at the regional level. Public hospitals are established by the 
self-governing regions, private for-profi t and not-for-profi t hospitals are regulated by 
the self-governing regions. The public health-insurance company VsZP and the pri-
vate health-insurance companies, such as Dovera and Union, all three are headquar-
tered in Bratislava, which is far away from most regions.  
Second, the self-governing regions have hardly any vertical tools to ensure the 
minimum network. Most of the hospitals in their territories are either Ministry of 
Health institutions or independent private bodies. Because the self-governing regions 
themselves own only a few hospitals in their area, all other lines of coordination are 
horizontal for them, except for the opportunity to ask the Ministry to act on their be-
2 Self-governing regions are NUTS III in Slovakia, in this case NUTS II level bett er refl ects the 
problem.
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half in relation to the health-insurance companies. Table 3 indicates the structure of 
hospitals in Slovakia when main changes started.
Table 3: Regional Hospitals in Slovakia (2009)
Ownership
Western Slovakia Central Slovakia Eastern Slovakia
Bratislava Total
TT TN NR BB ZA PO KE
Public hospitals 4 4 2 2 5 3 1 1 22
Other hospitals owned
by non-profi t or private organizations 4 8 6 14 5 21 11 14 83
Abbreviations
of regions:        
TT – Trnava, TN – Trencin, NR – Nitra, BB – Banska Bystrica, ZA – Zilina, PO – Presov, KE – Kosice.
 
Source: Ministry of Health
Third, the fact that self-governing regions were asked just to decrease the num-
ber of existing hospitals and beds in the region in a way prescribed by the Ministry, 
instead of being enabled to implement their own independent regional healthcare 
policies, presented an issue. Under these circumstances, the relative policy-making 
freedom of the self-governing regions was reduced to the painful task of closing some 
hospitals. 
The Banska Bystrica region can serve as an example of what happened on the re-
gional level. Before the fi nancial crisis, the region started to evaluate the network of 
hospitals. The university-level advisers suggested that the region should use two core 
criteria for sett ing the minimum network: the average yearly number of hospitaliza-
tions in the region, and the physical access of the patients (travel time by public trans-
port). The underlying criterion for the minimum network was the level of hospitaliza-
tions in diﬀ erent districts of the region. Experts calculated the level of physical access 
according to two criteria: the percentage of citizens able to access the nearest hospital 
within 60 or 120 minutes and the average travel time per citizen.
The core problem was that the ‘optimal network’ modeled according to these cri-
teria diﬀ ered signifi cantly from the network of hospitals that existed before the 2007 
Ministry of Health’s fi rst ordinance on the minimum network. As a result, the areas 
with more hospitals would have to close one or more hospitals. However, the region-
al assembly never took a formal vote on the proposed minimum network, for both 
political and technical reasons. 
Initially, the fact that there were actually more hospitals than in the minimum net-
work was not perceived as a problem by the Banska Bystrica regional government. 
The situation changed after 2008 due to strong pressure from the central government. 
Consequently, the minimum network became more of an order from the central gov-
ernment than a decentralized objective to be achieved by the regions. The Ministry 
used its indirect vertical connections with the public insurance company VsZP, which 
agreed to refl ect the proposal for the minimum network in its reimbursement system 
(VsZP did not continue to conclude contracts with hospitals outside the minimum 
network). The private companies later adopted the same approach, by which the 
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‘redundant’ regional hospitals lost most of their revenues. With insuﬃ  cient revenue 
(revenues from insurance companies represent a major part of hospital income, di-
rect payments are rather limited, and subsidies from state and regional budgets are 
normally not provided for running expenditures), smaller hospitals closed down or 
merged with the dominant hospital in the area. Within a few years, the total number 
of regional hospitals in this region halved. It decreased from 16 to 8 (5 non-profi t and 
3 for profi t). Although the goals of optimization were achieved, the issues regarding 
costs and benefi ts of such change need to be discussed. This is the focus of the next 
section.
4. Discussion 
The ‘minimum network’ of inpatient hospital care in Slovakia presents an interest-
ing case in the worldwide perceived need to reduce healthcare costs and for the study 
of complex networks. 
As to the consequences for network theory, the Slovak case indicates that even 
in complex networks, vertical power remains crucial and can be used by semi-inde-
pendent actors in the network to accomplish changes that they cannot accomplish 
on their own. In this case, the vertical power of the national ministry was ‘gratefully’ 
awaited and accepted by the ‘independent’ regions, to avoid a situation in which they 
themselves would be blamed for the reduction of the healthcare network (the region-
al authorities have the actual legal power to dismiss/dismantle public regional hospi-
tals and may not issue licenses for private ones). Furthermore, this situation indicates 
that the eﬀ ectiveness of such processes of change (the eﬀ ectiveness in terms of results 
from the changes is evaluated later in this text) does not depend on the quality of the 
process in terms of good governance practices. As it was argued above, transparency, 
consultations, and predictability were mostly absent during the process of change, 
and it appears that most of the key players were not too disappointed about the lack 
of good governance (for some explanations, see Vesely, 2013).
As to the eﬀ ects of the changes, we discuss some aspects of the policy process be-
low and evaluate the provisional short-term outcomes. 
First, as to the process, both the Ministry and the regions were expected to set 
transparent rules for building the minimum network. Although the medical commu-
nity repeatedly requested clarifi cation, this did not come about at any time in the 
entire history of this process of transition. 
Second, certain originally interesting and potentially positive ideas were consid-
erably adapted in the implementation process to achieve completely diﬀ erent goals 
from those originally intended. The initial purpose of establishing the minimum net-
work of inpatient care was to ensure general access to healthcare. In reality in the 
later phase, because of fi scal constraints, the Ministry sought to reduce the number 
of hospital beds under the heading ‘minimum network’ (by defi ning upper limits for 
the provided healthcare capacities – hospitals, wards, beds). This is an interesting ex-
ample of how original intentions are transformed over time. The goal to optimize the 
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network was att ained relatively successfully, because the legal defi nition of a ‘min-
imum network’ was imprecise, and diﬃ  cult to put into practice, especially as there 
were no implementation guidelines. This allowed the change from the original inten-
tion to the new one (from a guarantee of physical access to a means of optimizing the 
network to reduce the fi nancial costs of the healthcare system). 
Third, regional self-governments with very limited vertical implementation pow-
ers were expected to set their own rules and to establish a ‘minimum network’ on 
their territory. This did not happen during the fi rst phase, because there was a risk 
of diﬃ  cult political fi ghts at the regional level. The regions had to rely on the verti-
cal power of the national ministry, and the optimization of the network on the basis 
of relations between the Ministry and VsZP was in the end the best choice for all of 
the regions. The inhabitants of smaller cities were, of course, unhappy to lose their 
small hospitals, but there were no major protests. Partly this can be explained by the 
fact that many of these hospitals were closed because of bankruptcy, framed as a pri-
vate sector failure, instead of as being caused by administrative decisions of regional 
self-governments. 
Fourth, the study provides certain policy lessons from the point of view of pub-
lic-private partnerships. The ownership mix among insurance companies is expect-
ed to be a source of competition, resulting in improved services. However, with the 
dominant role of one of the insurance companies, VsZP, in the system, and the strong 
position of the state in VsZP, real competition does not exist: two remaining com-
panies just followed the decision of VsZP to stop contracting with some facilities, as 
‘ordered’ by the Ministry of Health. 
The structure of hospitals is another issue on this topic. In certain dimensions, and 
especially for the quality of non-medical services, such as accommodation or food, 
privately-owned hospitals perform bett er. Private or non-profi t ownership often also 
implies budgets that are more constrained and need bett er fi nancial management 
systems. However, there are several risks with such an ownership mix. High-qual-
ity coordination and regulation are necessary for ensuring the balance of public and 
private interests. Private hospitals may go bankrupt or limit the scope of their activ-
ities. For example, they may only provide ‘lucrative’ health services. If this happens 
in areas where there are no alternate capacities, access can be endangered. The Slo-
vak solution, of a basic network of public teaching hospitals complemented with a 
network of private non-profi t and for profi t establishments, might be a good one. 
Finally, this case documents the high coordination capacity of the Ministry of Health 
of the Slovak Republic during the process of optimizing the hospital network in the 
country. It is diﬃ  cult to assess why the Ministry was so successful in this particular 
case and encountered non-resistance from all of the main actors (including patients).
Overall we can conclude that, taking into consideration the fi nancial crisis, the 
Ministry basically adapted to the changing conditions of the fi nancial market by 
changing its concept of a minimum network. It is very diﬃ  cult to measure if the pro-
cesses of optimizing the network positively or negatively aﬀ ected the quality of ser-
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vice (a uniform central system for evaluating patient satisfaction does not exist in Slo-
vakia); however, our opinion is that except for the non-transparency of the process, 
the optimization of the network of hospitals in Slovakia represents a positive example 
of a concrete public policy.  
The most obvious benefi ts concern the fi nancial consequences of decreasing the 
number of small hospitals and the number of hospital beds in Slovakia, thus slowing 
the unsustainable growth of health capacities in the country and stabilizing the level 
of indebtedness of the healthcare system (Tables 1 and 2). From an expert viewpoint, 
this change had another positive short-term eﬀ ect: it enabled a higher quality of care 
because of the greater specialization in larger hospitals. 
The closing of hospitals may deliver several negative eﬀ ects, but we may argue 
that in this case, the negative eﬀ ects are minimal, if any. The optimization of the hos-
pital network did not signifi cantly reduce access to healthcare services. At the level 
of academic hospitals, there is almost no change in the maximum travel times of pa-
tients in need of specialized care. At the regional level, the example of the Banska 
Bystrica region shows that in all areas except one, citizens can reach inpatient care 
within 60 minutes by public transport (Hrckova and Kuvikova, 2011). 
The optimization also did not infl uence waiting lists in a negative way. A recent 
study on waiting lists in Slovakia (Muzik and Szalayova, 2013) documents that wait-
ing list for certain indications do not depend on physical capacity constraints (Table 
4), but on fi nancial resources available and spending priorities of insurance compa-
nies. Partly because of the public att ention to this issue in the media in Slovakia, pro-
voked by the publication of the preliminary results of this study, additional resources 
were invested to decrease the number of patients waiting for treatment in early 2013 
(see Table 4).
Table 4: Waiting lists in Slovakia (number of patients per insurance company)
Date VšZP Dôvera Union Total
30. 04. 2013 7 778 2 709 124 10 611
31. 10. 2012 14 242 2 937 160 17 327
31. 03. 2012 16 310 3 074 157 19 541
31. 10. 2011 7 888 2 943 102 10 933
31. 10. 2010 6 476 2 539 160 9 175
Source: Muzik and Szalayova (2013)
The last potential negative side eﬀ ects of this change, namely the increase of local 
unemployment, also did not appear. Table 5 presents data from the Banska Bystrica 
region, where half of the small hospitals closed in 2010-2012. The impact of closing 
hospitals on unemployment within the profession was marginal if any, since it was 
easy for unemployed professional staﬀ  from the closed hospitals to fi nd new posi-
tions.
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Table 5: The number of unemployed in Banska Bystrica region – sector N (healthcare, veterinary services)
XII 2007 XII 2008 XII 2009 2010 2011 April 2012
675 672 1143 1128 1062 1066
Source: http://www.upsvar.sk/statistiky/nezamestnanost-stvrtrocne-statistiky
A potential lesson from this situation relates to the future consequences of the 
minimum network. Making the minimum hospital network equal to the actual net-
work creates certain access risks. Under such conditions, existing providers represent 
a highly monopolistic structure. This may infl uence their behavior, and raises a very 
important question: What if some of them close down? Decreasing the number of 
hospitals may be easier than replacing the missing capacities. If there is no supply of 
potential new operators willing to enter the healthcare market, regional self-govern-
ments will struggle to establish new capacities on their own. The risk of long-term 
shortfalls in capacities is high, especially in Slovak conditions, where the reimburse-
ment rates from health insurance companies barely cover the actual hospital costs. 
The concept of a minimum network of inpatient healthcare is an interesting health-
care policy instrument. Formally, it seems to be a very positive att empt to guarantee 
equal access to high-quality healthcare services. However, in reality several imple-
mentation problems may generate important future risks. 
It is still too early to draw any defi nitive conclusions, as short-term results may 
diﬀ er from long-term results, as often happens in public policy-making and imple-
mentation processes. Although the short-term results of this coordination exercise are 
predominantly positive, the long-term eﬀ ects may be diﬀ erent, especially since a mo-
nopolistic supply structure has been created.
5. Conclusions 
This study described a change made in the healthcare system in Slovakia in order 
to keep it aﬀ ordable. It showed how the initial interpretation of minimum network as 
an assurance for general access to healthcare services slowly changed into a cutback, 
making the minimum network an upper limit for healthcare. It argued that the com-
plexity of the network made for non-transparent policies, in which consultation was 
nearly absent and vertical power was dominant. This observation runs counter to the 
network theory suggestions that in complex networks, with semi-independent actors, 
vertical power becomes useless and agreements must be reached by consultations 
and horizontal coordination. 
Although we are the last to promote the bad practices seen in the healthcare re-
form in Slovakia in this regard, it is striking to see that the semi-independent actors 
‘gratefully’ accepted the use of vertical power by the central government and the am-
biguity and obscurity with which it acted during the process of closing down hospi-
tals and reducing the healthcare network. It is also striking that despite these defects 
in the process, the positive results as mentioned occurred and massive protests were 
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hardly seen. This outcome disputes the assumption, widely accepted among network 
theorists, of the causal relation between process and outcomes. Under that assump-
tion, positive outcomes should depend on transparent processes in which mutual di-
alogue and recurrent consultations among the actors in the network are central. The 
Slovak case argues otherwise. This case indicates that when diﬃ  cult decisions have to 
be made, the actors in the network might be happy if another actor is able and willing 
to take the responsibility for such decisions by using its power.
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